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Abstract
We propose a model where an autocrat rules over an ethnically divided society. The
dictator selects the tax rate over domestic production and the nation's natural resources
to maximize his rents under the threat of a regime-switching revolution. We show that
a weak ruler may let the country plunge in civil war to increase his personal rents.
Inter-group ghting weakens potential opposition to the ruler, thereby allowing him to
increase scal pressure. We show that the presence of natural resources exacerbates
the incentives of the ruler to promote civil conict for his own prot, especially if
the resources are unequally distributed across ethnic groups. We validate the main
predictions of the model using cross-country data over the period 1960-2007, and show
that our empirical results are not likely to be driven by omitted observable determinants
of civil war incidence or by unobservable country-specic heterogeneity.
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11 Introduction
In many countries around the world, autocrats impose highly rapacious policies on their
population and yet manage to remain in power for long periods of time. Surprisingly, such
practices have also been observed in countries plagued by internal civil strife in spite of
the potential threat these conicts constitute to the government's stability (Reno 1998).
The weakly institutionalized environment characterizing these societies implies that demo-
cratic instruments available to balance the power of the ruling elites are limited and highly
dysfunctional: legislators and interest groups are typically co-opted by the elite and, as a
consequence, elections fall short of disciplining ill-performing leaders (Gandhi and Przeworski
2006). Such de facto dictatorships have been studied by scholars who emphasize the web of
personal ties and targeted transfers which guarantee the stability of the elites (Bates 1981
and Jackson and Rosberg 1984).1
Acemoglu et al. (2004) explore a strategy - which they call Divide-and-Rule - adopted
by rulers who seek to implement more protable kleptocratic policies by weakening the
opposition. They propose a model whereby the ruler can be overthrown only if a suciently
large opposition is mobilized. The ruler prevents this collective action by providing selective
incentives, thereby making it impossible for a successful challenging coalition to emerge.
Padro i Miquel (2007) considers an alternative strategy of regime survival implemented by
rent-extracting autocrats in ethnically divided societies. The proposed mechanism rests on
what the author denes as The Politics of Fear. Indeed, \[T]he fear to fall under an equally
inecient and venal ruler that favors another group is sucient to discipline supporters"
(Padro i Miquel 2007: 1260). In other words, by dampening the livelihood of the other ethnic
groups, the ruler obtains support from his own group and still manages to extract rents from
them. The co-ethnics' obedience is rooted in the fear of receiving a worse treatment under
the potential rule of a non co-ethnic leader.
In line with Padro i Miquel (2007) we propose a model whereby an autocrat rules over
an ethnically divided society. The ruler selects the tax rates on income and on natural
resources that maximize his private rents under the threat of rebellion: While the ruler
is not accountable to the people through elections, his power can be challenged through
popular uprising. If the rebellion is successful, the ruler looses the capacity to levy taxes.
We characterize the equilibrium conditions under which it is in the interest of the ruler to
let an civil conict among ethnic groups to escalate within the boundaries of his country.
Inter-group violence weakens the citizens' potential to collectively revolt against the ruler,
1See also the subsequent work on co-optation and patronage, including Acemoglu et al. (2008), Egorov
and Sonin (2009) and Sekeris (2011).
2hence allowing the latter to increase the scal pressure without risking his power.
Our simple model delivers three novel predictions. First, we show that weaker rulers
prot more from the emergence of a civil strife. Second, we show that the ruler's gains
from internal conict are larger the greater is the country's endowment of natural resources.
Indeed, when the ruler's income is mainly derived from taxing natural resources, the costs
of inter-ethnic violence are lower since violence aects especially labor production. In turn,
the potential gains from conict are large because in the face of weakened ethnic groups the
ruler can capture a larger share of the natural resources without triggering a revolution.2
Third, the ruler's gains from internal conict are larger if resources are distributed unequally
across ethnic groups.
While the salience of ethnic divisions in triggering civil conicts has received mixed
support by empirical studies (Fearon and Laitin 2003, Collier and Hoeer 2004, Montalvo
and Reynal-Querol 2005), ethnic violence has been widely studied in conict theory. Yet,
most contributions explain ethnic conicts by exploring only the incentives of the parties
directly involved in the dispute (Caselli and Coleman II 2006, Esteban and Ray 2008, Esteban
et al. 2010). Instead, we emphasize a mechanism that highlights the incentives of an idividual
ruler above and beyond his ethnic identity. Indeed, the private interests of a rent seeking
autocrat are not necessarily aligned with those of his ethnic base. Considering the ruler
as a separate agent is an abstractions that helps us then explore the proposed mechanism
theoretically.
The incentives for a ruler to stress the ethnic divide have already been addressed in
the literature (E.g. Fearon and Laitin 2000). According to Snyder and Ballentine (1996)
and Snyder (2000), political elites exploit the nationalistic argument in newly democratizing
countries as a way to preserve their dominant position. Similarly, Glaeser (2005) proposes
a theory in which political leaders dig existing societal cleavages by conveying messages
that exacerbate hatred between groups with the ultimate goal of fostering electoral support
for particular policies. We push this argument one step further and argue that a ruler
might consciously let inter-ethnic violence degenerate into a destructive conict in order to
maximize his personal rents.3
We illustrate our formal argument with case studies from the recent history of Africa.
Most importantly, however, we provide robust cross-country empirical evidence which is
2This constitutes a dierent mechanism than those proposed by the literature for the positive association
between natural resources and conict. This association has been highlighted, among others, by Collier and
Hoeer (1998) and (2004), Reynal-Querol (2002), Ross (2004), and Hodler (2006).
3While Rocco and Ballo (2008) also show that an autocrat may nd it protable to plunge their country
into a wasteful civil war, their underlying mechanism is fundamentally dierent. In their theory the ruler
uses the government's army against the opposition's forces when the odds of winning the conict exceed the
chances to remain in power in peaceful times.
3consistent with our main theoretical predictions. In particular, using a dataset on con-
ict incidence as well as novel data on presence of oil and diamonds elds over the period
1960-2007, we show that the likelihood of autocratic and ethnically-polarized countries expe-
riencing civil war is higher when weak rulers govern states endowed with natural resources.
This nding is robust to controlling for the variables identied by the recent literature on
civil war as the most robust correlates of conict (Collier and Hoeer 2004; Fearon and
Laitin 2003), as well as to the inclusion of regional dummies. In addition the results survive
the inclusion of country and time xed eects. This suggest both that our theory can also
account for the within-country variation overtime in the exploitation of natural resources,
the autocracy level, and the relative weakness of the ruler, and that the results are not driven
by year specic shocks common across countries.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses anecdotal evidence
from recent conict among ethnic groups in Nigeria and Kenya, which were exploited by
the countries' rulers to pursue their personal interests. We develop the theoretical model in
section 3 and present the empirical analysis in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Anecdotal evidence from recent history
2.1 Nigeria
In 1993, in the middle of widespread economic downturn, General Sani Abacha seized po-
litical power and was the de facto President of Nigeria until 1998. Driven by the drop of
oil prices, Nigeria was facing balance of payment diculties, increasing decits and debt
burden, and high ination rates (Bolanle 1999, Ikelegbe 2001). In addition, old patronage
politics were collapsing partly because of the cut in external support after the end of the
Cold War (Reno 1998). Due to the diversion of large shares of the oil revenue to the pockets
of the political elite, the popularity of the regime was particularly low among the Ogoni, an
ethnic group located in the oil-rich southeastern region.
Abacha's government heavily depended on oil revenue and could not aord to give in
to the pressing requests of the Ogoni. Instead, the president dealt with the hostility by
destabilizing the Ogoni region through the use of state violence in the form of killings, rapes,
and looting by the security forces, and with deliberate attempts to foster conicts between
the Ogoni and their neighboring ethnic groups (Reno 1998). Indeed, the regime constantly
tagged as ethnic rivalries attacks that independent observers attributed to the regular army
(Ibeanu 2000, Human Right Watch 1995, Reno 1998). For instance, when four traditional
chiefs were killed during an Ogoni rally in 1995, Abacha blamed local Ogoni activists for the
4killings and sentenced them to death (Ifeka 2000, Ikelegbe 2001). The evidence that emerged
afterwards, however, suggests that Abacha's regime was behind the murders (Reno 1998).
The strategy proved successful and Ibeanu (2000, p. 26) laconically concludes: \[...] at
that point, the implosion of MOSOP [Movement for the Salvation of Ogoni People] was
completed and the struggle became Ogoni against Ogoni".
A similar strategy was adopted to instigate violence between Nembe and Kalabari ethnic
groups. According to witness reports, regular army soldiers killed fourteen Nembe, whereas
ocials claimed it was part of a Kalabari plot to appropriate Nembe's land. According to
Reno:
The militarization of local factions is an eective way to ensure that communities
in oil-producing areas cannot unify to challenge the regime. This tactic eectively
destroys civil society, replacing it with sets of rival ethnic organizations [...] (Reno
1998, p. 206).
This strategy enabled Abacha to contain successfully the outbreak of rebellion. His ve-
year rule over Nigeria was primarily used for his own benet and in favor of his associates,
despite his relative weakness and the unfavorable economic conditions (Bolanle 1999). After
Abacha's death on June 7 1998, his family members were forced to give up thirty-seven
residences and $750 million. It has been estimated, however, that before his death Abacha
managed to secure about $5-7 billion abroad (Reno 1999).
2.2 Kenya
Kenya has experienced repeated episodes of ethnic violence over the last 20 years. The
ethnic legacy passed from the British colonialists to Jomo Kenyatta in 1964 is one of deep
antagonisms, reecting the divide-and-rule policy pursued during the colonial years. Both
Kenyatta, an ethnic Kikuyu, and his successor Daniel arap Moi, an ethnic Kalenjin, im-
plemented redistribution policies favoring their ethnic group, thus further nourishing the
pre-existing ethnic tensions (Burgess et al. 2011). On the eve of the 1991 elections, as well
as in the aftermath of both the 1991 and the 2007 elections, the country experienced severe
episodes of ethnic strife that led to thousands of killings and hundreds of thousands of in-
ternally displaced people. Most analysts converge on blaming the resource-greedy elites for
having engineered these violent events to serve their personal interests (Kahl 2006, Kagwanja
2009, and Rutten and Owuor 2009).
The 1991-1993 events are particularly telling. The intensication of pro-multiparty voices
compelled president Moi to repeal in 1991 Section 2A, a constitutional amendment that made
5Kenya a single-party state. The response of the ruling elite was immediate and came in the
form of a series of political rallies (known as the Majimbo rallies) organized by the Kenya
African National Union's (KANU) across all the country. The speeches of ocials during
these meetings conveyed particularly violent messages of hatred and intolerance towards the
Kikuyu and Luo ethnic groups. The elites accused them of stealing the ancestral lands of the
Kalenjin and the Maasai (Africa Watch 1993, Kahl 2006: 143). KANU ocials radicalized
local populations by explicitly demanding land evictions by violent means, while emphasizing
that the bravery of Kalenjin and Maasai \warriors" would not tolerate the usurpation (Africa
Watch 1993: 12-18, Klopp 2001).
As a result of the ethnic confrontation over 1500 were killed and over 300,000 were
forcibly displaced over the 1991-1993 period (Africa Watch 1993, Kahl 2006). While the
authorities emphasized their inability to cope with the situation because of lack of resources,
posterior court testimonies revealed the active role of highly ranked KANU gures in the
organization of death squads recruited from the cities' slums (Kagwanja 2009). In addition,
many argue that the length of the confrontation and the idleness of security forces reveal the
unwillingness of the ruling party to deter the ethnic conict, irrespective of the ethnicity of
the victims (Kahl 2006).
That the conict appears to have been orchestrated by a weakened central regime that
exploited existing enmities, inequalities and grievances between the country's various ethnic
groups has been emphasized by various scholars.4 This strategy was crafted at the end of
the Cold War era, when the power of the ruling elite was signicantly reduced and political
opposition from other parties became a real threat. In this context ethnic clashes eventually
allowed the ruling elite to retain power and pursue their extractive policies.
These stories motivate the argument that we now formalize in the next section. Sub-
sequently, however, we show that the scope of our argument goes beyond the case studies
emphasized here, by highlighting robust longitudinal empirical patterns that support the
predictions of our theory.
3 The Model
3.1 Set up
We consider a country populated by two equally-sized ethnic groups respectively designated
by A and B, and a ruler L. Each group i is composed of n agents who control the natural
4See especially Colin H. Kahl's thesis of the state exploitation conicts (Kahl 2006), and the Africa Watch
1993 report on divide-and-rule politics in Kenya (Africa Watch 1993).
6resources located on their own territory. Thus group i owns a share 'i of the country's total
resources R, with 'A + 'B = 1. Each ethnic group decides on the manpower to allocate
to productive, wi, and ghting, fi, activities. The production technology is assumed to be
linear and hence the total income of group i equals 'iR + wi. The ruler can tax all the
nation's income by applying group-specic taxes, A and B.5
If group i decides to allocate manpower to ghting, fi > 0, this force may serve two
purposes: On the one hand this militia can be used to loot the resources of the other ethnic
group, in which case we have a conict. On the other hand it may serve to mount a rebellion
against the ruler so that the group can avoid paying taxes. If a rebellion occurs, the ruler's
army ghts the rebels and no taxes are collected if the rebellion succeeds. The ruler controls
an army of force a, and decides how to divide it between protecting himself from a potential
rebellion, aL, and deterring potential inter-group conicts from arising, aD.
Given the above description of the agents' actions, we now turn to the associated payos.
In the absence of a civil war (superscript C) and of a rebellion (superscript R), the country
is at peace (superscript P), and ethnic group i's payo is given by its after tax income:
U
P
i = (1   i)('iR + wi) (1)
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aL+fi is a simple ratio-form contest success function that constitutes the probability













aL+fi is the probability that the rebellion is unsuccessful in which case the ruler
appropriates all the rebelling group's natural resources, and enjoys the revenues from taxing
the other group.
5Modifying this assumption and constraining the ruler to impose a unique tax rate in the whole country
reduces the ruler's utility at equilibrium. All results are however robust to such a change. Similarly, allowing
the ruler to impose dierent tax rates on natural resources and on labor production leaves the results
completely unchanged.
7When group i initiates a conict over the control of group j's natural resources (a civil
war), but refrains from rebelling against the ruler, it obtains:6
U
C
i = (1   i)
fi
aD + fi + f i
(R + wi) (5)
where the contest success function features the ruler's eort to deter inter-groups' conict,
aD, a share of the army which we assume is deployed to help the targeted group. Equation
(5) also assumes that only natural resources and not the production of the rival ethnic are
appropriated through conict. In case of defeat, however, an ethnic group is not able to
carry on production successfully.
The attacked group's payo is then given by:
U
C
 i = (1    i)
aD + f i
aD + fi + f i
(R + w i) (6)
The ruler's payo takes into account that, absent rebellion, taxes on both groups can
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3.1.1 Timing
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The ruler decides the pair  = fA;Bg, and the allocation of the army between
protecting himself aL from rebellion, and deterring civil conicts aD.
6Even in in reality some share of individuals engaging in inter-group violence are more motivated by ethnic
hatred than by a rational economic calculus, the driving reason is often linked with wealth redistribution
issues.
82. The two ethnic groups simultaneously decide whether to attack each other or not. If
either group initiates hostilities, civil war ensues.
3. Each ethnic group individually decides whether or not to mount a rebellion against
the ruler.
We solve the model backwardly by looking at Subgame Perfect Equilibria.
3.2 Analysis
Stage 3:
The optimal response of group i at stage 3 depends on the outcome of stage 2, i.e. whether
the country experiences civil war not.
i) Suppose the outcome of stage 2 is not civil war.
Group i should decide whether or not to rebel. If it rebels it then optimally allocates
its n individuals between production activity and rebellion. The maximization problem of
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(10)
Subject to the manpower constraint: ni = fi + wi.
The optimization yields the following interior solution:
f
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i = (aL (aL + n + 'iR))
1=2   aL (11)











On the other hand, if the the group does not rebel, it allocates all the manpower to the
productive activity, which gives ethnic group i the following payo:
U
P
i = (1   i)('iR + n) (13)
The group thus decides to mount a revolution if UPR
i > UP
i . Rearranging this inequality
allows us to identify the tax rate, P
i , above which group i would opt for rebellion:

P
i = 1  
h







9ii) Suppose the outcome of stage 2 is civil war.
Denote by fC
i the number of ghters allocated by group i to the inter-group conict in
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(15)
Starting a rebellion would mean facing the entire army (both the share deployed to guard
peace and the share protecting the ruler) as well as the other group's army. On the other
hand, no taxes are paid to the ruler in case of a successful rebellion.




































On the other hand, not rebelling implies that group i gets taxed at some group specic
rate C




















where aD is the share of the army deployed by the ruler to guard peace in the country in
the rst stage of the game. The comparison of equations (17) and (18) allows us to compute
the threshold tax rate C
i above which group i would rebel. This yields:

C







Taking into account the optimal responses of stage 3, we now solve for the two groups'
optimal allocation of manpower between production and ghting in stage 2, where players
choose whether or not to initiate a civil conict. From ethnic group i's perspective, provided
it is protable to provoke a civil war, the problem consists on maximizing (5) with aD set
to zero since at equilibrium a ruler will never reduce his own defense by deploying part of
10the army across the country if civil war can not be prevented.7 For interior solutions, the
optimal strength to deploy in a civil war from i's perspective (in expectation of a civil war)







The utility derived by group i if an ethnic conict occurs and if no rebellion is mounted
is therefore given by:
U
C






To determine whether a civil conict occurs, it is necessary to derive the payo an ethnic
group would obtain if it was to deviate from a peaceful situation. This in turn will allow us
to deduce whether any group has incentives to deviate from a peaceful equilibrium. In other
words, we need to determine the optimal size of a militia for group i, when the other ethnic
group ( i) has allocated all its manpower to the productive activity, and given the forces aD
deployed by the ruler to guard peace. From group i's perspective, the problem consists in




i = (1   i)
h







Since we have derived the ethnic groups' best responses to the ruler's tax rates and
optimal army deployment, we can solve the game's rst stage. In order to reap the maximal
wealth from its citizens, the ruler uses two tools: the tax rates and the army deployment.
Let us rst consider the latter tool. The ruler decides the amount of troops aD that will
be deployed across the country to deter the ethnic groups from clashing each other. For
deterrence to be successful, it is necessary that both ethnic groups are unwilling to initiate
hostilities given that the other group is unprepared for ghting. Since both groups are
endowed with the same ghting technology and face the same opportunity cost of mobilizing
ghters, the ethnic group whose resources endowment is the lowest has the highest incentives
to start a conict. Without any loss of generality assume 'A > 1=2. If the deterrent force
is to be eective, therefore, the following condition should be satised: UC
B  UP
B. Using
7Notice that for presentational reasons we do not describe the optimization o the equilibrium path,
though whenever relevant we shall equally refer to these results. In other words, we do not present the
situation where the ethnic groups anticipate a rebellion in the game's last stage since at equilibrium the
ruler always selects a vector of tax rates that averts rebellion.
11equations (13) and (22) for group B, we can easily determine the minimal amount of troops






A ruler with an army a <  aD is unable to deter a civil war. For such weak rulers
deploying part of the army across the country instead of using it to protect themselves
would be suboptimal. Indeed, the lower the protection of the ruler, the easier it is to mount
a coup, which eventually translates into a lower optimal tax rate. Similarly, any aD >  aD
would unnecessarily reduce the ruler's defense. We thus conclude that aD = f0; aDg. In
other words, the ruler will either just deter a conict from occurring or abstain entirely from
any deterrent activities.
The optimal vector of taxes from the ruler's perspective is such that he extracts the
maximum wealth from the two groups without causing a rebellion.8 In other words, the
ruler will set the taxes such that the subjects are exactly indierent between rebelling and
not. Therefore, if the ruler deploys the deterrent contingent  aD, the optimal tax rate is given
by (14), whereas if civil conict is anticipated, the optimal tax rate is given by (19).
Our discussion around the optimal level of aD yields a rst result.9
Proposition 1. Civil conicts always occur if the ruler is too weak.
Proof. A ruler with an army of size a <  aD cannot deter a civil war. Indeed, attacking the
other group when aD <  aD always yields a larger payo to A than under peace. The claim
in Proposition 1 follows directly.
The utility of a ruler with an army a   aD who chooses to deter civil conict is given by
(2), which after substituting for the optimal tax rates yields:10
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If the ruler, however, does not deploy a deterrent contingent, the ethnic groups always
deviate from the peaceful situation. Thus, whenever aD = 0, a civil conict will occur.
8It can be shown that there always exists a tax vector for which the utility of the ruler is higher than
under rebellion.
9Throughout the paper the results presented in the propositions hold for the entire range of admissible
parameters' values. Both interior and corner solutions are formally dealt with in the Appendix.
10Notice that UP
L is not dened for a <  aD, as the ruler would not have enough power to deter an ethnic
conict.
12The utility of the ruler is then given by equation (7) after replacing fC
A and fC
B by their
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The ruler therefore decides whether or not to deploy the deterrent forces by comparing
(24) to (25). On the one hand, averting a civil conict grants the ruler the largest tax base.
Indeed, when the ethnic groups enter into an armed struggle, potentially productive resources
are diverted to ghting activities. On the other hand, despite the partial reduction of the
ruler's tax base, civil conict reduces the contestants' capacity of rebellion and strengthens
the defenses of the ruler, thereby increasing the tax rates the ruler can impose. In the context
of an on-going conict between the ethnic groups, the group willing to mount a rebellion
will have to ght both the other ethnic group and the ruler's army. We now turn to analyze
the trade-o between tax-base and tax rate when varying the model's key parameters.
The following proposition describes how the ruler's strength as measured by the size of
his army will inuence the equilibrium:
Proposition 2. There exists a unique ruler's strength level above which he preserves peace
and below which a civil conict occurs.
Proof. A formal proof is provided in Appendix A.1.
Propositions 1 and 2 deserve a brief discussion. These results suggest that a country
ruled by a weak dictator is expected to experience internal conicts. Indeed, very weak
dictators (a <  aD) do not have the sucient strength to deter the most motivated group in
the society from starting a conict over natural resources. Interestingly, countries ruled by
relatively weak dictators (who nevertheless control an army a >  aD) are also expected to
experience civil conicts. Unlike in the previous case, this is the result of a rational calculus
by the ruler: by concentrating all his forces a to protect himself from a potential rebellion
he can impose larger tax rates. Refraining from deploying a peace-keeping force results in
a civil war which destroys part of the tax base. The gains from larger tax rates, however,
exceed the tax base loss.
Figure 1 plots the outcome of a simulation exercise to help visualize the result of Propo-
sition 2. While the horizontal axis represents the strength of the ruler, the vertical axis
measures his utility. A ruler whose army is weaker than  aD is unable to deter a civil conict.
As a consequence, for that range of a, only UC
L (dashed curve) is dened. For intermediate
strength values (a 2 [ aD;~ a]), the burden of preserving peace exceeds the increase in tax base,
13thus the ruler refrains from preventing civil conict. Interestingly, for a >  aD, increasing the
ruler's strength reduces the gap in the tax rates under peace and conict, while the gap in
tax bases remains constant. Indeed, the tax base loss under conict is entirely determined
by the amount of resources (n and R) at stake, since aD = 0 (see equation 20). The waste of
resources under conict eventually makes the peace-preserving strategy more protable for
suciently strong rulers (a > ~ a).
A consequence of this nding is that a negative shock on the personal power of a strong
autocratic ruler can be conducive to civil conict, either because the ruler is no longer able to
support peace (if the shock aects the ruler strength such that his resulting army a <  aD),
or because it is no longer in his interest to do so.
Another parameter of interest in the analysis is R, the amount of natural resources. The
next proposition summarizes our ndings on the eect of natural resources:
Proposition 3. There exists a unique stock level of natural resources below which the ruler
preserves peace, and above which civil conict occurs.
Proof. A formal proof is provided in Appendix A.2.
Like in Proposition 2, the intuition behind this result lies in the eect of natural resources
on the ruler's taxing ability under the two scenarios. Indeed, increasing the amount of natural
resources has two eects. On the one hand, under both scenarios a larger stock of natural
resources increases the tax base. Interestingly, the tax base increment under peace is larger
than under conict as in the latter scenario more natural resources divert more labor from
production to ghting. On the other hand, however, increasing natural resources also inates
the cost for the ruler to preserve peace in terms of soldiers to deploy ( aD) to deter a civil
conict. As a consequence, larger resource stocks reduce the forces dedicated to directly
protecting the central regime from a potential rebellion, thereby pushing downwards the tax
rate that can be imposed under the peace scenario. For large resource stocks this last force
prevails. Thus, for a suciently large amount of natural resources, the ruler should deploy
the entire army for deterrence to be successful. This, however, makes the ruler powerless
vis-a-vis the potentially rebellious ethnic groups. As a consequence the ruler's payo is nil.
When the presence of abundant resources makes the country very unstable, the ruler nds
it more protable not to avert a civil conict and to prot from it (by imposing larger tax
rates), instead of devoting a large share of his army to maintain peace.
It is worth stressing that the ruler's decision depends on the amount of natural resources
relative to labor productivity. Throughout this paper we consider a unit marginal produc-
tivity of labor. Had we allowed for a more ecient production technology this would have
14increased the threshold level of natural resources conducive to a conict equilibrium without,
however, qualitatively modifying the ndings.
In Figure 2 we present the results of a simulation that helps visualizing Proposition 3.
While the horizontal axis represents the level of natural resources in the country, the vertical
axis measures the utility of the ruler. The dashed curve describes the utility of the ruler
under conict. Instead, the solid curve represents the utility of the ruler if he decided to
maintain peace in the country.
While UC
L is monotonically increasing in R, UP
L experiences a decrease in R for large
stocks of natural resources. Indeed, for large values of R securing peace leaves the ruler with
relatively little forces to face a potential rebellion. As a consequence the eect of additional
increments of resources on the tax rates under peace becomes increasingly important and
eventually exactly osets the increase in the tax base. This occurs for the level of resources
for which the solid curve reaches its maximum. For any larger stocks of natural resources,
the tax base expansion does not compensate for the reduction in the tax rates. The negative
slope of UP
L for large resource stocks in Figure 2 captures these dynamics. Eventually, for
R >  R, the ruler is better o under civil conict.
The last comparative statics exercise highlights the role of inequality, i.e. whether and
how the initial distribution of natural resources across the two ethnic groups inuences the
ruler's policy decisions. The next proposition addresses this issue.
Proposition 4. Higher inequality in initial resource endowments increases the occurrence
of civil conicts.
Proof. A formal proof is provided in Appendix A.3.
The impact of inequality on the emergence of an internal conict has been widely inves-
tigated in the literature.11 From our model we can show that a more unequal distribution
of natural resources across groups in the society makes the deterrence strategy more costly
for the ruler because of the higher incentives for the society's poorest group to violently
appropriate resources. As a consequence, when governing a society characterized by high
inequality in the distribution of resorces, a ruler nds it more protable to have an inecient
conict over resources, and to exploit his subjects through higher tax rates.
We can now summarize the main ndings of the model. We have shown that it may
be in the interest of an autocratic ruler to foster an inecient internal conict in a divided
11Early studies posit that conicts are mainly triggered by strong grievances (Gurr 1970, Scott 1976).
More recently, Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Collier and Hoeer (2004), among others, challenged this
view. Various scholars nevertheless insist on pointing at the increased likelihood of observing conicts in the
presence of unequal distribution of resources (Murshed and Gates 2005, Hidalgo et al. 2010, De Luca and
Sekeris 2010).
15society by foregoing the peace-keeping role of the army under his control. Such conicts
imply a partial loss of the ruler's tax base since otherwise productive labor gets diverted
towards ghting. By protecting himself with the entire army, on the other hand, the ruler
can impose higher tax rates which more than compensate the loss in terms of tax base.
Our comparative statics predict that internal conict is more likely to be fostered: (i) by a
relatively weak ruler, (ii) in the presence of abundant natural resources, and (iii) in societies
where natural resources are distributed less equally.
The next section confronts these predictions to cross-country data on civil wars in recent
history.
4 Empirical evidence
We now test the main predictions of the model. We focus for our main empirical analysis on
Propositions 1 to 3, which describe the eect of ruler weakness (Propositions 1 and 2) and
the stock of natural resources (Proposition 3) on the probability that a civil conict occurs
in an autocratic country that features an ethnic divide. Since we do not have good data
on the distribution of natural resources within countries, our test of Proposition 4 is only
suggestive and we leave it in the appendix (see section A.4).
Note that, taken together, Propositions 1 to 3 imply that civil conicts (in ethnically
polarized, autocratic societies) occur if two conditions are met: the autocrat must be weak
enough, and there should be enough natural resources. We can test this empirically by
looking at the eect on the probability of civil war occurrence of the interaction between
natural resources and some proxy of the dictator's weakness in the subsample of autocratic,
ethnically polarized countries. Such is the essence of our empirical strategy, which we explain
in detail after we describe the data.12
4.1 Data and sample
The dependent variable is a dummy that describes whether a civil conict took place in
country i at year t. The source is the Uppsala/PRIO conict dataset, available from the
Uppsala Conict Data Program (Gleditsch et al. 2001).13
12It is important to stress upfront that our empirical exercise is guided by the predictions of our model,
and that we are not claiming any clean identication or strong causal interpretation in the empirical exercise,
beyond what the theoretical model suggests.
13While we present results that use the broader denition of internal conict of the Uppsala/PRIO data,
namely an armed challenge to the central government by an organized group that produces at least 25 battle
related deaths over the course of the year, our results are robust to limiting the sample to denitions that
increase the battle death threshold.
16We use the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2002), which assigns to each country
(each year) a score in the autocracy{democracy spectrum. Because our story is one of
the incentives of autocratic rulers, we keep only the subsample of countries closer to pure
autocracy using as threshold the median of the distribution of country-years in the regime
type spectrum. Our results are robust to variations in the arbitrary cuto.
Similarly, and in line with our model which highlights that the perverse incentives of
the autocratic ruler occur in ethnically polarized societies, our sample of country-years gets
further reduced when we take the countries above the median of the ethnic polarization
index of Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005). Again, our results are robust to variations in
this cuto.
Mainly because of the availability of income data for a large set of countries (source:
PWT 6.3, Heston et al. 2009), our sample covers the period 1960{2007.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the main set of variables used in the analysis.
We report the summary statistics for the entire sample of autocrats, that of ethnically
polarized autocracies, and also that of ethnically polarized autocracies that have an unequal
distribution of natural resources according to our proxy of resource distribution.14 In the
sample of autocracies (top panel of Table 1) civil war occurs in 14.4% of the country-years.
The middle panel of Table 1 shows that the mean incidence of civil war is reduced slightly
(13.5%) when looking at the sample of ethnically polarized autocracies.15
Our proxy for the presence of natural resources is a time-varying dummy that equals
one if a country produces either oil or diamonds. We compute this using two recent and
comprehensive datasets that record longitudinal world-wide production of the two minerals
(oil: Lujala et al. 2007; diamonds: Gilmore et al. 2005). Roughly 41-42% of the observations
produce either or both minerals and this is true both for the sample of autocracies and for
that of ethnically polarized autocracies (Table 1).
We control in our regressions for the variables identied by the recent cross-country
literature as the most robust correlates of civil war (Collier and Hoeer 2004 and Fearon
and Laitin 2003). These include population, which we also add as a scale control, per capita
GDP and its rate of growth, and the proportion of mountainous terrain which controls for the
geographic characteristics facilitating the mobilization of rebellious movements. In addition,
we control for how open countries are to international markets and add regional dummies.
14The proxy is the inverse of the number of oil elds in each country-year (source: Lujala et al. 2007). We
take the countries below the median number of elds as indicating the places where resource distribution
is likely to be worse. Our results are robust to changes in this cuto. Because this proxy is only a rough
approximation of the actual distribution of natural resources among groups in society, we treat this analysis
as exploratory and leave it in the appendix (section A.4).
15The mean incidence gets further reduced if the sample is restricted to the countries with unequal distri-
bution of resources (10.1%).
17The descriptive statistics of these variables are reported on Table 1.
4.2 Empirical strategy
Propositions 1/2 and Proposition 3 of our model imply that, within the sample of ethnically
polarized autocracies, civil conicts are more likely to occur in places with natural resources
(which constitute an incentive to engage in war against other groups) and when the autocrat
is weak (which makes him less likely to devote soldiers to prevent inter-group ghting).
Our main empirical specication looks at these predictions jointly by looking at the
eect on the probability that civil war takes place in a given country at a given time, of
the interaction between the dummy for resource presence and our proxy for weakness of the
dictator.
For the latter we exploit the time variation provided by the end of the Cold War, an event
which has been widely identied as a negative shock to regimes that received aid from either
the US or the Eastern Bloc. Indeed, Reno (1997, 1998), and Ndulu and O0Connell (1999)
document how the end of the Cold War came with the decline of interest for the African
continent. In addition, Boschini and Olofsgard (2007) estimate that the amount of foreign
aid from the West was systematically higher in periods of increased security concerns, as
measured by estimated military expenditures in the former Eastern Bloc, only during the
Cold War era. Similarly, Fleck and Kilby (2010) demonstrate that foreign aid has not
targeted the neediest countries during both the Cold War and the War on Terror (after
2001). Moreover Berthel emy and Tichit (2004) emphasize that since the beginning of the
1990s, aid was directed according to economic criteria as opposed to global strategic reasons.
Thus, we estimate:
Yi;t = +1PostColdWart+2NatResi;t+(PostColdWarNatRes)i;t+Xi;t+"i;t (26)
where Yi;t is a dummy that equals one if civil wars took place in country i at year t,
PostColdWart is a time dummy that takes value one starting in 1990, NatResi;t is a dummy
that equals one if country i produces either oil or diamonds at time t, Xi;t is a vector of
time-varying controls, and "i;t is the error term.
The coecient of interest is , which captures the eect on the incidence of civil war of
the interaction between the presence of natural resources and the weakness of the dictator.
184.3 Main results and robustness
We estimate equation (26) with a linear probability model.16 Table 2 reports the benchmark
results focusing on , the coecient of interest.
The dierence between columns 1 and 2 is that, while the former uses the entire sample
of autocracies, column 2 is closer to our model in the sense that it looks at the subsample
with higher values in the ethnic polarization index. Interestingly, the positive eect of the
interaction between the post Cold War dummy and the presence of natural resources on
the likelihood of civil war incidence is higher in the latter subsample, and we stick to it for
the remainder of the empirical analysis. According to the estimated coecient of column 2,
which is signicant at the 1% level, the probability that an ethnicaly polarized autocracy
experiences civil war increases by 8.8 percentage points when the autocrat is weak and the
country has natural resources.
Columns 3 to 6 illustrate the robustness of our result by additively including various
controls. We start with the variables identied in the cross country empirical literature as
the most robust correlates of civil war (column 3). These are population size, per capita
GDP (both of which we measure in logs) and the rate of growth of the economy.17 The
size of the coecient is virtually unchanged compared to the regressions without controls.
Column 4 adds two additional controls, also frequently signicant in the empirical literature,
namely the roughness of the terrain (as measured by the proportion of mountainous terrain
from Fearon and Laitin's dataset) and openness. The coecient does not lose signicance
but doubles in magnitude. Now the interaction of interest increases the probability of civil
war in 17 percentage points. This estimate remains very similar (16 percentage points) when
introducing regional dummies that capture continent-specic heterogeneity (column 5). The
last column of Table 2 shows that clustering the standard errors at the country level does
not kill the signicance of the eect.18
16Angrist and Pischke (2008) argue that OLS consistently estimates the linear conditional expectation
function and minimizes mean-squared error and, for binary outcomes, recommend linear probability models
over limited dependent variable models like Probit or Logit. However, all our results are robust to tting a
Probit model on (26).
17The other variable robustly associated with civil war is the presence of natural resources, especially oil.
This specic variable is part of our interaction of interest and we include the non interacted version of it
[recall equation (26)].
18Table A.4 in the appendix repeats the exercise carried out from columns 2 through 6 in a subsample that
(beyond the autocracy and ethnic polarization requirements) focuses on countries with unequal distribution
of natural resources. We do so as a preliminary test of Proposition 4, which states that the incentive for
autocrats to let civil war surge in their countries is higher the more unequal is the distribution of resources.
The interaction of interest is not only positive and signicant across columns, but it is also larger in magnitude
which could be interpreted as support of the proposition.
194.4 Additional robustness checks
The empirical association reported on Table 2 between the incidence of civil war and the
interaction of natural resources with the weakness of the ruler is very supportive of our theory.
We have shown that this association is robust to controlling for the relevant correlates of civil
war identied in the cross-country empirical literature and that it survives the inclusion of
continent dummies and even a stringent correction of the standard errors (when we cluster
them at the country level). We now look at the robustness of this association to additional
tests and alternative measures of our independent variables of interest.
Table 3 presents the additional robustness checks. The rst two columns include, ad-
ditively, country and year xed-eects. This controls for country specic time-invariant
heterogeneity, as well as for time shocks that are common across countries. That is, we
estimate the following variant of the model described in (26):
Yi;t = i + t + b2NatResi;t + g(PostColdWar  NatRes)i;t + Xi;t + i;t
where, in addition to the terms already dened, i and t are respectively country and year
xed eects.19
The coecient on our interaction of interest (in this case g) remains positive and signif-
icant.
Our main proxy for the weakness of the autocrat is a dummy for the post Cold War
period. One limitation of this variable is that it presents no time variation across units
or in terms of intensity. As shown respectively in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3, our results
are robust to using two other proxies of weakness. Borrowed from the dataset constructed
by Humphreys (2005), we look at the interaction of the presence of natural resources with
a measure of regime instability as well as a measure of regime strength, both country and
time-varying. Results are still consistent with our theoretical predictions: the interaction
between natural resources and regime stability is positive and signicant and, conversely,
that between natural resources and regime strength is negative and signicant. While this
robustness is reassuring, our preferred proxy is the dummy for the post Cold War period
because the Humphreys variables are not available for the whole sample and they may also
have endogeneity problems that are less likely to be present when using the dummy.
Finally, the last two columns disaggregate our benchmark measure of natural resources'
presence (a dummy that equals one if a country produces either oil or diamonds in a given
year) into two: a dummy for production of oil only (column 5) and one for the production
19Note that the variable PostColdWar is not included in its non interacted version. This is because it is
a time dummy that gets absorbed by the year xed-eect.
20of diamonds. The estimated coecient is signicant in both cases which suggests that the
results are not driven by having the two commodities simultaneously.20
Overall, we nd a strong support in the data for our political economy story of the
perverse incentives of autocrats to prot from ethnic strife in weakly institutionalized and
ethnically polarized societies.
5 Conclusions
The observation that some weak autocrats ruling over ethnically divided societies seem
to have avoided intervening to control the escalation of violent conict in their countries
(if not favored such escalation altogether) is puzzling and, to the best of our knowledge,
no explanation has been oered in the social science literature. We propose a theoretical
framework that, by emphasizing the private incentives of autocrats in natural resource-rich,
ethnically divided societies, provides a rational explanation to such behavior. In our model, a
rent maximizer dictator sets taxes on production and natural resources and allocates military
eort both to protect himself from a potential rebellion and to deter the occurrence of civil
conict among the ethnic groups. The occurrence of civil conict undermines the tax base by
disrupting production but also lowers the probability that a group revolts, hence empowering
the ruler to set higher tax rates. We then show that weaker rulers (in the sense that are
less able to defend their regime) prot from the incidence of civil strife. When the primary
source of revenue comes from taxing natural resources the disruption that conict has on the
production economy is lower. Thus a second prediction of our model is that the autocrat's
gains from internal conict are proportional to the country's endowment of natural resources.
Moreover, we also show that the civil war dividend for the ruler is increasing in the inequality
of resource ownership across ethnic groups. This is explained by the predatory incentives of
the disadvantaged group toward the conscating the assets of the other vis  a vis engaging
in a coup attempt.
But in the paper we go beyond the model and back its predictions with empirical evidence.
In line with the model's setting, we look at the subsample of ethnically polarized, autocratic
countries over the period 1960-2007. Our dependent variable is the incidence of civil war
and our coecient of interest is the interaction between a dummy for the presence of natural
resources and a dummy for the post Cold War period. The latter is our benchmark proxy for
the weakness of the autocrat since it identies a period when most dictatorial regimes lost
both geo-strategic importance and access to nancial resources. The coecient associated
20The magnitude of the coecient is about three times larger when using the productions of diamonds as
the proxy for natural resources as opposed of using the production of oil.
21with the interaction, which supports our main theoretical predictions, is positive, signicant,
and robust to a variety of controls and the inclusion of country and time-xed eects: The
incidence of internal strife is higher in ethnically polarized countries ruled by weak dictators
and rich in natural resources. We also nd suggestive evidence that this eect is bigger in
places with worse distribution of natural resources.
Our paper contributes to the recent political economy literature on the incentives of
autocratic leaders in ethnically polarized and weakly institutionalized societies. By suggest-
ing a driver of civl war that had not previously been emphasized in the literature, we call
attention to a seemingly unintended consequence of international eorts for weakening the
leaders of autocratic regimes. This suggests that embargoes and other measures that aim
at weakening local autocrats in the quest for a more democratic world ought to be weighted
against alternative policies when rulers have incentives to hold on to power by any means,
even at the expense of the life of their people.
22Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Source
Sample of autocracies
Incidence of civil war 6,472 0.144 0.351 0 1 UCDP
Log Population 6,472 7.926 2.150 2.249 14.095 PWT 6.3
Log Real GDP pc 5,220 8.365 1.180 5.733 11.624 PWT 6.3
GDP growth 5,124 2.269 8.249 -64.360 131.243 PWT 6.3
Log Mountainous terr. 4,696 2.053 1.453 0 4.557 F&L (2003)
Log Openness 5,220 4.222 0.694 0.697 6.434 PWT 6.3
Dummy Prod. Nat. Res 6,472 0.416 0.493 0 1 Lujala et al. (2007)
Sample of ethnically polarized autocracies
Incidence of civil war 4,312 0.135 0.342 0 1 UCDP
Log Population 4,312 7.815 2.150 2.249 14.095 PWT 6.3
Log Real GDP pc 3,225 8.425 1.161 5.743 11.624 PWT 6.3
GDP growth 3,162 2.356 8.891 -64.360 131.243 PWT 6.3
Log Mountainous terr. 3,064 2.249 1.415 0 4.557 F&L (2003)
Log Openness 3,225 4.221 0.748 0.697 6.434 PWT 6.3
Dummy Prod. Nat. Res 4,312 0.414 0.493 0 1 CSCW/PRIO
Sample of ethnically polarized autocracies with unequal resource dist.
Incidence of civil war 3,479 0.101 0.301 0 1 UCDP
Log Population 3,479 7.295 1.937 2.249 11.353 PWT 6.3
Log Real GDP pc 2,638 8.406 1.173 5.743 11.624 PWT 6.3
GDP growth 2,585 2.277 8.839 -46.877 131.243 PWT 6.3
Log Mountainous terr. 2,231 1.969 1.466 0 4.557 F&L (2003)
Log Openness 2,638 4.296 0.719 0.697 6.434 PWT 6.3
Dummy Prod. Nat. Res 3,479 0.323 0.468 0 1 CSCW/PRIO
Notes: UCDP is the Uppsala Centre Data Program that maintains the Uppsala/PRIO Armed Conict
Dataset (Gleditsch et al. 2001). PWT is the Penn World Table (Heston et al. 2009). F&L (2003) is the
seminal paper of Fearon and Laitin (2003).
23Table 2: Benchmark results
Linear probability model. Dependent variable: Civil war incidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post Cold War x 0.069*** 0.088*** 0.082*** 0.171*** 0.164*** 0.164*
Resource presence (0.019) (0.023) (0.026) (0.034) (0.033) (0.086)
Controls
Population X X X X
GDP level X X X X
GDP growth X X X X
Rough terrain X X X
Openness X X X
Regional dummies X X
Country cluster X
Observations 6,472 4,312 3,162 2,240 2,240 2,240
R-squared 0.019 0.019 0.146 0.124 0.160 0.160
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Post Cold War end is a time-dummy that equals 1 for the
post-Cold War period. Resource presence is a dummy that equals 1 for the country-years with positive
production of either oil or diamonds, according to the DIADATA and PETRODATA from The CSCW at
PRIO. * is signicant at the 10% level, ** is signicant at the 5% level, *** is signicant at the 1% level.
24Table 3: Additional robustness checks
Linear probability model. Dependent variable: Civil war incidence
Fixed eects Weakness measure Measure of N. Res.
Country fe Year fe Instability Strength Oil Diamonds
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post Cold War x 0.113* 0.123*





Post Cold War x 0.051***
Oil presence (0.012)
Post Cold War x 0.150***
Diamonds presence (0.042)
Country xed eects X X
Year xed eects X
Observations 3,479 3,479 1,519 1,499 1,783 4,099
R-squared 0.024 0.047 0.040 0.043 0.013 0.006
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Post Cold War end is a time-dummy that equals 1 for the
post-Cold War period. Resource presence is a dummy that equals 1 for the country-years with positive
production of either oil or diamonds. Columns (3) and (4) use two dierent proxies of weakness, both
taken from Humphreys (2005): Instability is Fearon and Laitins (2003) measure of political instability and
Strength is a combination of Instability and the anocracy measure of the same authors. Oil presence and
Diamonds presence are dummies that equal 1 for the country-years with positive production of oil and
diamonds respectively. * is signicant at the 10% level, ** is signicant at the 5% level, *** is signicant at
the 1% level.
25Figure 1: The eect of the ruler's strength.
Figure 2: The eect of natural resources.
26A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
We need to prove the existence and uniqueness of an army size a such that UP
L < UC
L ,
8a < a and UP
L > UC
L , 8a > a. In order to ease the exposition, it is useful to highlight some
features that will be used throughout the proof. Notice that the groups' militia reaction
functions, fi(:), are monotonically increasing in the opponents' strength. As a consequence,
there always exists a level of a such that the optimal rebellion army equals n. Dene by
^ a the ruler's army size such that fPR
i = n, when 'i = 1 (i.e. in the most unequal case).
A second important feature directly linked to the previous point is that the utility of the
ruler is the lowest when 'i takes the extreme values of 0 or 1, thus implying that should our
reasoning hold for 'i = 1, it can always be reproduced for any 'i.
Since the utilities UP
L and UC
L behave dierently for interior and corner solutions, we
provide the proof for two subcases:
Case 1: R < 2n which implies that at the conict equilibrium, fC
i < n
Case 2: R  2n which implies that fC
i = n
Case 1
The sketch of the proof is the following. We show that 9a =  aD below which UP
L is not
dened, and at which UC
L ( aD) > UP
L ( aD) = 0. We then show that both UP
L and UC
L increase
monotonically in a, with UP
L growing at a faster rate. Finally we show that 9a = ^ a in which
UP
L (^ a) > UC
L (^ a), thus implying that UP
L and UC
L cross only one time.
To prove the claim in the proposition it is sucient to show the following conditions:
1. @UP
L =@a > @UC
L =@a > 0
2. UC
L = 0 for a = 0
3. UP
L = 0 for a =  aD
4. lima!1 UC
L = 2
3 (n + R)
5. UP
L (^ a)  lima!1 UC
L






(a    aD + n + 'AR)
1=2 + (a    aD + n + 'BR)
1=2





(a    aD + n + 'AR)
 1=2 + (a    aD + n + 'BR)
 1=2

(a    aD)
1=2 (27)
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 1 where 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This implies that both derivatives are weakly positive.












































1=2 Y  1=2 + Y
 1=2 Y 1=2
The rst inequality is satised if:
   XA   X
  <
  Y   Y
 
Substituting the original values of  XA, X,  Y and Y , we obtain:
n + 'AR < 3(n + R)
which is always true. Similarly, the second inequality is satised if:
n + 'BR < 3(n + R)
which is always true. This establishes Condition 1.
Condition 2 is veried by setting a = 0 in UC
L as given by (25). Similarly, condition 3 is
veried by substituting a =  aD in (24).
Let us consider condition 4. Since lima!1 C
i = 1, the ruler can appropriate the entire
28tax base, which in the interior conict equilibrium equals 2
3 (n + R).
In order to tackle condition 5, we rst compute ^ a. This value is found by setting the
ghters' best response when rebelling equal n. This level of a should then satisfy:
(^ a   aD)
1=2 (^ a   aD + n + R)
1=2   (^ a   aD) = n , (^ a   aD)(R   n) = n
2







The utility of group i of rebelling under peace when constrained (a  ^ a) is given by:
U
PR
i ja  ^ a =
n
n + a    aD
R (30)
Equating this expression to UP
i yields the `corner' tax rate from which we can obtain the
utility of the ruler in ^ a:
U
P




+  in = (2 +  i)n
Where  in is the tax revenue collected on the non-rebelling group whose share of natural
resources is ' i = 0.
It is straightforward to show that condition 5 holds for R < 2n, and  i  0:
U
P
L = (2 +  i)n 
2
3






It is useful to sketch the proof of this case as well. We rst repeat the steps of the
interior Case 1 (steps 1   3). We then verify that for values of a suciently large to induce
all individuals in the rebelling group to specialize as ghters, fi = n, the utility of the ruler
under peace grows at an even faster rate, thus implying that there is only one crossing
between UP
L and UC
L for the entire range of admissible values of a (condition 4).
To prove the claim in the proposition it is sucient to show the following conditions:
1. @UP
L =@a > @UC
L =@a
2. UC
L = 0 for a = 0
3. lima!1 UC
L < lima!1 UP
L
4. Denote by U
^ P
L the utility of the ruler under peace if the optimal rebellion for the
wealthier group implies everybody rebelling. Then, @U
^ P
L =@a > @UP
L =@a.
Let us start by computing UC
L and UP
L for R > 2n. Since for R  2n in the conict
scenario all agents are ghters, in case of rebellion and conict all agents would be ghters
as well (because fCR
i is increasing in the opponents' strength). The equilibrium conict tax
rate and UC




















Given the construction of the proof, in the peace scenario, we concentrate on the most
unequal case, which yields the lowest utility to the ruler. It can be shown that  aD as given
by (23) would be unnecessarily high for R > 2n, as fC
i ( aD) > n. The adjusted  aD which
deters the group with no resources from attacking the other group is instead given by:
U
P
 i = (1   
P)n = (1   
P)
n
n + ^ aD
R = U
C
 i ) ^ aD = R   n
For any a < R n, UP
L is not dened, and conict is the only equilibrium. Like for Case
1, there exists a value of a that we denote by ^ a such that 8a  ^ a, fPR
i = n. If a < ^ a then
UP
L is given by (24) with ^ aD = R   n.
We can now consider condition 1. Notice that @UP
L =@a is given by (27) with  aD = R n.
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Notice rst that since (a + 2n)   (a   R + n) > (a   R + n)   (a   R + n), then:

a + 2n
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a   R + n
a   R + 2n
1=2
> 2
Therefore, denoting  = nR
(2n+a)2, it is sucient to show:

a + 2n
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> 2(1 + )
,
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which is necessarily veried for positive R and n.
Condition 2 can be simply veried by setting a = 0 in (31).
It can be shown that lima!1 UC
L = R whereas lima!1 UP
L = R + 2n as both tax rates
tend to unity, which implies that condition 3 is also veried.
To tackle condition 4, observe rst that UP
















Taking the derivative with respect to a yields:
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Recall that the FOC for group i, when deciding on fPR




i + a    aD
=






i + a    aD)
2
If, however, group i is constrained to n when choosing fPR
i , then it would fail to optimally
adjust to futher increases in a. This in turn, implies a larger increase of UP
L for further
increases in a.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
The variable of interest being R, the utilities are expressed as a function of R. To prove
Proposition 3 we sequentially establish the following results:
311. UP






3. 9 ^ R > 0 such that @UC
L (R)=@R is constant 8R  ^ R
4. UP
L (0) > UC





6. 9  R such that UP
L (  R) = 0
Before dealing with each condition in isolation, we briey explain the intuition of the
general proof. By establishing that UP
L is larger than UC
L in R = 0 (Condition 1), and that
the opposite holds true for some  R (Conditions 2 and 6), we show that there exists at least
one switching value of R in the vicinity of which the deterrent strategy is preferable for
R <  R and the conict strategy is prefered of R >  R. The remaining conditions ensure
the unicity of this threshold. Indeed, Conditions 2, 4 and 5 guarantee that if the crossing
between UP
L and UC
L occurs for R <  R, then @UP
L =@R < 0, thus necessarily implying that
@UC
L =@R > @UP
L =@R for all R   R because of conditions 2 and 5. On the other hand,
condition 3 ensures us that if the crossing between UP
L and UC
L occurs for R   R, then the
linearity of UC
L together with the concavity of UP
L secures the unicity result.
1: Regarding the rst point, notice that if R = 0, then aD = 0, as no army is needed to deter
a war over resources. Condition 1 is therefore veried if the following inequality holds:
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1=2 > a (32)
And this is always true.










n + R + 3a




4(n + R) + 3a




Using the notation X = n+R+3a




Which is necessarily true 8X > 0.
3: The third condition states that for any R larger to some threshold value  R, the ruler's
utility under conict is linear in C. The ruler's utility is linear when all individuals are
ghting in the conict scenario. This situation is therefore realized when fC
i = n for both




^ R + n
3
= n ) ^ R = 2n
The utility of the ruler when R  ^ R equals R+n
3 and is therefore linear in R.





























, 4(2a + n)(2n + a)
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, 16(2a + n)
2 (2n + a)
4 + a
2n
4   8(2a + n)(2n + a)
2an
2 > 4(a + n)a(2n + a)
4
, 4(2n + a)
4  
4(2a + n)




4   8(2a + n)(2n + a)
2an
2 > 0
This inequality is necessarily veried if we drop the second (positive) term from the LHS,




2   (a + n)a









> 4(2a + n)an
2 > 0
And this last expression can easily be shown to be true.
5: For Condition 3 we need to consider various cases. On the one hand, aD may be constrained
in the sense that the minimal deterrent amount of guns is inferior to aD(fPC
i ) (where 'i 
1=2). On the other hand, fPR
i (aD) may be constrained by n. We sequentially show that
UP
L (R) is concave in all cases, starting with the fully unconstrained one.
The second order derivative of the unconstrained equilibrium utility function of the ruler
under peace, UP
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a   aD + n + 'iR
a   aD
1=2 'i(a   aD) + a
0
D(n + 'iR)
(a   aD + n + 'i)2
To establish quasi-concavity, it is sucient to show that if
@UP
L







@R2 = 0. To conclude that
@2UP
L
@R2 < 0, it is sucient to show that the next
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a   aD + n + 'iR
1=2!
Simplifying this expression, we obtain:
a
0
D(n + 'iR) > 0
And this last term is necessarily positive.
In the second case, aD = nR
'iR+n   n, thus implying that a
0
D > 0, and a
00
D > 0. By the
same reasoning as in case 1, this implies that UP
L is quasi-concave in R.
Lastly, we ought to consider the case where fPR
i (aD) = n. Assume that only group i





L = 2n + R  

(a   aD + n + ' iR)






By taking the second order derivative w.r.t. R, applying an analogous reasoning to









And this can be shown to be true.
6: Condition 6 requires that UP
L (  R) = 0 for some  R > 0. Fixing a = a
0, it is therefore
sucient to show that there exists a  R such that aD(  R) = a
0. Condition 6 is therefore
satised by the fact that @aD(R)=@R > 0, whether aD is constrained (aD = R   n) or not
(aD = ('R)2=(4(n + (1   ')R))).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Notice rst that increasing inequality, modeled as an increase of 'i in the range [1=2;1],
enters the ruler's problem only in UP
L . As a consequence we only need to check the sign of
34@UP
L












































L is a short notation for
@aL
@'i.
The last expression can be decomposed as:
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h











































(aL + n + 'iR)




(aL + n + (1   'i)R)
1=2
#
which is always negative for a0
L < 0.







Consider  aD as dened by (23). Increasing 'i increases the numerator and decreases the
denominator. We can conclude that  a0
D > 0 ) a0





L does not depend on 'i, we can conclude that increasing inequality
makes peace less protable for the ruler.
A.4 Appendix table
35Table A4: Exploring the role of resource inequality
Linear probability model. Dependent variable: Civil war incidence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post Cold War x 0.144*** 0.155*** 0.250*** 0.257*** 0.257***
Resource presence (0.024) (0.026) (0.036) (0.037) (0.087)
Controls
Population X X X X
GDP level X X X X
GDP growth X X X X
Rough terrain X X X
Openness X X X
Regional dummies X X
Country cluster X
Observations 3,479 2,585 1,663 1,663 1,663
R-squared 0.012 0.263 0.188 0.202 0.202
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Post Cold War end is a time-dummy that equals 1 for the
post-Cold War period. Resource presence is a dummy that equals 1 for the country-years with positive
production of either oil or diamonds, according to the DIADATA and PETRODATA from The CSCW at
PRIO. * is signicant at the 10% level, ** is signicant at the 5% level, *** is signicant at the 1% level.
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